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RIPARIAN RIGHTS- INLAND LAKES
The southeast corner of respondent's property lay underwater in a
land-locked non-navigable lake. The owners of the contiguous tracts to the
cast and the south erected barriers along the property lines which united
at this corner. Respondent's minute circumvallated sector of the lake was
thereby rendered inadequate for recreational purposes. Removal of the
barriers was sought through mandatory injunction. Held, granted: where
each of multiple properties embraced land underlying the lake, each owner
was entitled to use of the entire lake; provided, such use did not transgress
the concurrent rights of the others. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791
(Fla. 1959).
The rule was early formulated in England that non-tidal non-navigable
lake bottoms were susceptible of private ownership.' Most jurisdictions
hold that the English rule obtains.2 In the majority of these jurisdictions
so recognizing private ownership, it was further decided that an owner
of a segment of a lake bed was restricted to use of those waters overlying
his land while he pursued the usual recreations of fishing, boating and
swimming.3 This conclusion was a literal extension of the common law
1. Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641 (1878); Menzies v. Macdonald, 2
Macq. 463, II.L. 9 Scots Rev. Rep. 692 (Scot. 1856); Cochrane v. Earl of Minto,
6 Paton 139, ILL. 2 Scots Rev. Rep. 541 (Scot. 1815), construing enfeoffinents
dating from 1520.
2. Crutchfield v. F. A. Sebring Realty Co., 69 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1954); Bannon v.
Logan, 66 Fla. 329, 63 So. 454 (1913); Sanders v. DeRose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E.
331 (1934); In re Opinions of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 106 At]. 865 (1919)(littoral proprietors may own lake bed except where, by size, lake meets statutory
definition of a great pond); '1own of 'Wcst Roxburv v. Stoddard, 7 Allen 158 (Mass.
1863) (except for ponds over ten acres which are reserved for the public); Burt v.
Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23 NAV.2d 117 (1946); Lamprey v. Danz, 86 \linn. 317,
90 NV. 578 (1902); State Game & Fish Commn'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539,
193 So. 9 (1940); Walden v. Pines Lake Land Co., 126 N.J.Eq. 249, 8 A.2d 581 (1939);
Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102 (N.Y. 1862); Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio 336,
24 N.E. 686 (1890); Baylor v. Decker, 133 Pa. 168, 19 AtI. 351 (1890); Taylor
Fishing Club v. Ilarnmett, 88 S.V.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Proctor v. Sim,
134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925). Contra, Ne-Pce-Nauk Club v. Wilson, 96
Wis. 290, 71 N.\V. 661 (1897), held that a riparian owner owns to the middle of a
stream but the state owns bed of an inland lake.
3. Sanders v. DeRose, su pra note 2, ". . . each owner has the right to the free
and unmolested use and control of his portion of the lake bed and water thereon for
boating and fishing"; Lamprey v, Danz, supra note 2, where owner was enjoined frons
boating over neighbor's portion of lake to retrieve fowl shot from blind erected in his
own sector; Walden v. Pines Lake Land Co., supra note 2; Commonwealth Water Co.
v. Brunner. 175 App. Div. 153, 161 N.Y. Supp. 794 (1916), '. . . have no right to
fish, boat, bathe, take ice, race horses upon the ice, or do any other act in or upon any
part of said lake under which they do not own the land" (by dictum the court said
their decision was contra common law); Lembeck v. Nye, suprra note 2; Smoulter v.
Boyd, 209 Pa. 146, 58 At]. 144 (1901), tield owner could erect fence in water; Taylor
Fishing Club v. Hammett, supra note 2, held owner has exclusive right to boat and
fish in the water area over his land.
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theory that an owner exercised absolute dominion and control indefinitely
upward from his property line.4
A minority of the jurisdictions concluded that each lake bottom owner
was entitled to use of the entire lake." Two approaches were evident in
reaching this conclusion. First, a rational determination that the concept
of riparian interests applied to lakes as well as streams, 6 that the rights
to fish and boat were riparian in origin7 and that ownership of a segment
of the lake bottom did not alter those rights.8 Second, an admission of
an owner's right to an interest extending upward from his land, but a
determination that the interest was one of control rather than one of
absolute dominion.9
4. Lamprey v. Danz, 86 Minn. 317, 321, 90 N.W. 578, 580 (1902): "It is
elementary that every owner has exclusive dominion over the soil which lie absolutely
owns; hence such an owner of land has the exclusive right of hunting and fishing on
his land, and the waters covering it."; 73 C.I.S. Property § 7 (1951).
5. Beach v. Ilayner, 207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487 (1919), a part owner and his
licensees "may use the surface of the whole lake for boating and fishing"; State Game
& Fish Conm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940); Improved Realty
Corp. v, Sowers, 195 Va. 317, 78 S.E.2d 588 (1953); Snively v. Faber, 48 Wash.2d
815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956), where several owners held land bordering a non-navigable
lake, boating, fishing and other similar rights were owned in common and any
proprietor or his licensee could use the entire lake. See also Cochrane v. Earl of Minto,
6 Paton 139, H.L. 2 Scots Rev. Rep. 541 (Scot. 1815), where each owner could dig
bottom marle in his division only but the rights of fishing and fowling were common
to each over the entire lake: Mackenzie v. Banks, 3 App.Cas. 1324 (1878), where
one owner was denied use of the entire water area because that area was defined as two
lakes although connected by a very shallow strait. Cf., Menzies v. Macdonald, 2 Macq.
463, 11L. 9 Scots Rev. Rep. 692 (Scot. 1856).
6. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1890), discussing an Illinois patentee, held
that where patent is issued for land bounded by stream or lake, title passes for the land
under the water; Mix v. Tice, 164 Misc. 261, 298 N.Y.Supp. 441 (Sup.Ct. 1937);
Cochrane v. Earl of Minto. suptra note 5.
7. United States v. Villow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 505 (1945): "The
fundamental principle of this system is that each riparian proprietor has an equal right
to make a reasonable use of the waters of the stream, suhject to the equal right of
the other riparian proprietors likewise to make a reasonable use"; Improved Realty Corp.
v. Sowers, 195 Va. 317. 78 S.E.2d 588 (1953); Mackenzie v. Banks. 3 App.Cas. 1324
(1878), wherein the court stated that riparian ownership conferred the rights to boat,
fish or shoot fowl.
S. State Came & Fish Comin'n v. Louis Fritz Co.. 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9(1940), where one of six proprietors owned most of the lake bottom, the court held
"Where there are several riparian owners of an inland lake, each owner, their licensees,
and any other inhabitant who can gain access thereto without trespass, may use the
surface of the whole lake for boating and fishing.... ." Herein lay a crux of the
difference between the majority and minority opinions. The majority view focused
on bottom ownership by grant and rationalized that such ownership instilled the owner
with greater surface rights than the riparian owner. The minority focused on the
surface rights and rationalized that they resulted from riparian proprietorship which
obtained whether the bottom ownership came bv grant or through the ripa. See also
1 FARNTAM, VATERS & \VATiR RICoTs 305 (1904): ". . . the principle which makes
riparian rights depend on contact with the water is not always perceived when the
boundary line is in the water."
9. Beach v. Hayner. 207 Mich. 93. 95, 173 N.W. 487, 488 (1919): Where
plaintiff owned most of lake bottom, the court held that licensees of the other bottom
owners could use the surface of the whole lake for boating and fishing. The court
agreed that the question was whether one owner could exclusively "use and control" his
property against the licensees.
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The instant case came before the court because of apparent conflict
with earlier decisions'0 in Florida, but those decisions were easily distin-
guished. 11 The court acknowledged the majority' 2 holding but denied
that it was 'obligated""' to embrace it. Accordingly, the court was
unrestricted in exercising its "judicial discretion" 4 in determining the
litigants' rights and was at liberty to "take into account . . . our social
and economic customs and present day conceptions of right and justice."'15
In exercising its discretion the court adopted the more "liberal" attitude.
That "liberal" attitude coincided with the minority' 6 viewpoint but the
court denominated it "civil law.' ' 7
In Duval v. Thomas, supra, the court had an opportunity to take an
unfettered harmonious step forward in the resolution of water rights in
Florida. However, by needlessly labeling its decision as being founded
on the civil law, the court has reared another problem. The water rights
of riparian owners, under the civil law, are curbed by the paramount
rights vested in the public under the concept of res publicae'8 which
permits the creation of an usufruct' by appropriation.20 Thus the civil
10. Osceola County v. Triple E. Dev. Co., 90 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956); Hamilton
v. Williams, 145 Fla. 697, 200 So. 80 (1941); Pounds v. Darling, 75 Fla. 125, 77 So. 666
(1918); Clement v. Wilson, 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912).
11. Osceola County v. Triple E. Dev. Co., su/ra note 10, where the defendant
owned the entire lake bed and surrounding land, the county condemned a right of way
to the water's edge and tried to assert a use in the public to boat and fish; Hamilton v.
Williams, supra note 10, which held that a person owning land had the exclusive right
to hunt upon it; Pounds v. Darling, supra note 10, which held that the City of Orlando
could not prevent abutting owners from bathing in a lake used as a public water supply
because such action would be taking property without due process; Clement v. Wilson,
supra note 10, where defendant owned all land around a non-navigable cove except
at its mouth where it emptied, plaintiff was held to be a trespasser when he went
upon the cove.
12. See eases cited note 3 supra.
13. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1957), declares the common law of Florida to be the
same as that in England prior to July 4, 1776. In the instant case the court stated
. research has not divulged the clear, unambiguous pronouncement of the common
law . . that would leave us no room but to adopt it."
14. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1952): "When the rules of common
law are in doubt ..... we are sometimies called upon to determine what general
principles are to be applied, and in doing this we, of necessity, exercise a broad judicial
discretion."
15. Here the court took judicial notice of tourism as a salient factor for consideration
and calculated that "immeasurable" damage would result if our visitors, as guests, were
restricted to fishing and swimming only in those waters within the host's property lines.
16. See cases cited note 5 suPra.
17. The civil law recognized both private ownership of subaqueous lands and common
usage of the water itself. See SANrARs, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 168 (1876).
18. Id. at 36: "res publicae, things which belong to the State, as the State land,
navigable rivers ... "
19. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail. 11 Cal.2d 501, 555, 81 P.2d 533, 560
(1938): ". . . the riparian does not 'own' the water of a stream, he 'owns' a usufructory
right-the right of reasonable use of the water"; SANDARS, INSTITUTES O JUSTINIAN 194
(1876): "Usufruct is the right of using, and taking the fruits of things belonging to
others ...It is a right over a corporeal thing."
20. The instant case recognizes Snivelv v. Jaber, 48 Wash.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015
(1956). as a pronouncement of the civil law. Apparently the court overlooked the
included concept that a usufructuary interest in water can be acquired for reasons
other than riparian ownership, Accord, Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114
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law is broader in scope than the common law theory of riparian rights.21
Accordingly, a further decision will be necessary to delineate the precise
amount of civil law adopted in this case.
The court is to be commended for its ultimate definition of the
respective rights of the owners in the present case. Well-reasoned, well-
mannered men have for centuries adhered to a mode of social intercourse
which permitted, even demanded, a reasonable sharing of waters. By virtue of
its elemental fluidity, water, like air, infuses each owner with the benefits
of a Kantorian unity and those benefits alone suffice to sustain a sharing.
It is suggested however, that Florida, endowed with a relative largesse
of water, need not adopt more of the civil law than is essential for the
determination of the rights of owners situated exactly as those in the
instant case.
ARTHUR . TOOTHMAN
(1925), where appellant owned entire bed and all border area of lake and appellee, a
nearby non-riparian owner, entered and pumped water for irrigation; held: owner's "only
vested right is the beneficial use of the waters for irrigation and domestic purposes . , .
any surplus waters are subject to appropriation for irrigating non-riparian lands.";
SANDARS, INSTITUTES 0'F JUs'rrNTAN 191 (1876): ". . . among the servitudes of rural
estates are rightly included the right of drawing water.
21. PoNIE.Rov, RiPARIAN RIGHTS § 21 (1887), states that appropriation is not
available tinder the common law doctrine of riparian rights.
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